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CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-WHAT IS THE NECESSITY FOR
PROOF OF CRIMINAL INTENT UNDER A FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL STATUTE WHICH MAKES NO REFERENCE TO IN-
TENT? Morissette v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952.) Joseph
Edward Morissette was convicted of knowingly converting to his
own use property of the United States, i. e., some apparently
abandoned practice bomb cases which were rusting into the ground
on a government reserve. Morissette discovered these bomb cases
while hunting for deer. To his trained junkman's eye they had
possibilities for profits, and, thinking to realize some benefit out
of an otherwise fruitless hunting trip, he hauled the bomb cases
away in his truck during broad daylight. He later realized $84.00
from the sale of the metal in these cases.
After investigation by a curious patrolman, Morissette was
arrested and convicted in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan under Title 18, U. S. C. A,. Sec. 641 (1948),
which provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly
converts to his own use or the use of another, or with-
out authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record,
voucher, money or thing of value of the United States
if the value of the property does not exceed the
sum of $100, shall be fined not more than $1000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both.
Notably, the above section was a consolidation of Sections 82, 87,
100 and 101 (G) of Title 18, U. S. C. A. (1940), which had been
so worded that the element of intent was clearly necessary before
the crimes therein set out could be found.
The trial court refused to admit evidence of Morissette's
belief that the property had been abandoned, and it instructed the
jury that the element of intent, not being specifically set out in
the statute, was not a necessary element of the crime.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed
Morissette's conviction on appeal,' and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Mr. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion of the
Court, said: "This case would have remained profoundly insig-
nificant, but it raises questions which are both fundamental and
far reaching .
How far can the doctrine of "Public Welfare" 2 offenses be
extended by the omission of the element of intent in statutory
definitions of common law crimes? The distinction between crimes
1Morissette v. United States, 187 F. 2d 427 (1951).
'Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
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mala in se and crimes mala prohibita has been the subject of some
controversy. The Court said concerning crimes mala prohibita:
While such offenses do not threaten the security of
the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded
as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence
impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the
social order as presently constituted in this respect, what-
ever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same,
and the consequences are injurious or not according to
fortuity . . . The accused, if he does not will the viola-
tion, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more
care than society might reasonably expect . . . Also,
penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.
The situation is otherwise as to crimes mala in se: 4
Stealing, larcency, and its variants . . . were among
the earliest offenses known to the law . . . they are in-
vasions of right of property which stir a sense of in-
security in the whole community and arouse public de-
mand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when a
sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a
felony . . .. State courts of last resort, on whom fall
the heaviest burden of interpreting criminal law in this
country, have consistently retained the requirement of
intent in larceny-type offenses . . . Congress, therefore,
omitted any express prescription of criminal intent from
the enactment . . . in the light of an unbroken course
of judicial decision in all . . . states . . holding in-
tent inherent in this class of offense, even when not ex-
pressed in a statute.
The court held that the term "knowingly converts" was used
by Congress to plug the many loopholes that occur when a crimi-
nal statute too specifically sets out offenses that existed as common
law crimes. "It is not difficult to think of intentional and knowing
abuses . . . of government property that might be knowing con-
versions but which could not be reached as embezzlement, stealing
or purloining."
Nevertheless, the defendant must have knowledge of the facts,
though not necessarily the law, that make the taking a conversion,
says the Court. Mere taking of possession is not enough.
It is not appaient how Morissette could have know-
ingly or intentionally converted property that he did not
know could be converted, as would be the case if it was
in fact abandoned or if he truly believed it to be aban-
doned and unwanted property.5
The Court said that presumptive intent had no place in this
case. Clearly that high tribunal is being very chary of inter-
' Morissette v. United States ...... U. S. 72 S. C. 240, 246 (1952).
4 Id. at 248.
5 Id. at 254.
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preting criminal statutes as being directed against persons inno-
cent of scienter. Historically the Court is on sound ground. The
idea of intent was manifested at an early date in the Pentateuchal
legislation, Nos. XV: 27, 28. It grew through the Roman codifi-
cations of the law, reaching its culmination in the English law.
Finally transferred to and dignified in the law of our own courts,
mens rea has become firmly fixed as a necessary element of crime.
6
In the belief of this commentor, presumptive intent has no
place in any crime which existed at common law.
KENNETH SELBY
OIL AND GAS-TREASURER'S DEED WILL NOT PASS
TITLE TO A PREVIOUSLY SEVERED MINERAL ESTATE
WHICH WAS NOT SEPARATELY ASSESSED FOR TAXES-
Mitchell v. Espinosa (.... Colo ..... 1951-52 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18,
p. 242). Lawyers concerned with oil and gas and other mineral in-
terests in Colorado were greatly interested in the Colorado Su-
preme Court's recent decision in the case of Mitchell v. Espinosa,
supra. In this case the court held that a tax deed to land by de-
scription will not pass title to a previously severed mineral estate,
where such an estate was not separately assessed. This holding
raises some very real problems in real estate law and may seri-
ously affect some existing oil and gas interests.
The United States issued a patent to the real estate in ques-
tion to Mitchell in 1912. In 1926 Mitchell conveyed the land to
Hamer by warranty deed, reserving (in the habendum clause)
"one half of oil right." A tax deed was issued to Jacobson in
1933. The interest reserved in Mitchell had not been separately
assessed. In order to avoid the necessity of a quiet title suit,
Jacobson took quit claim deeds from both Mitchell and Hamer.
The deed from Mitchell referred to and excepted the one-half
interest reserved to him in the original warranty deed. In the
present case plaintiffs instituted a quiet title suit to establish their
interests in the minerals involved, claiming under Jacobson, the
grantee in the tax deed.
One or two preliminary questions settled by the court in this
case may be of interest. The court noted that the tax deed in
question was not issued until fifteen days after the day fixed for
such issuance in the notice thereof to the owner. In holding that
this discrepancy in dates did not void the tax deed, the court said:
If the deed does not actually issue until a date subse-
quent to that fixed by the notice as being the day when
it will issue, no substantial right of the person entitled
to redeem has been lost or impaired; on the contrary,
the right to redeem continues, in this case for fifteen days,
beyond the time fixed by the notice.
6Social Science Encyclopedia, p. 126.
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In so holding the court expressly overruled the recent case of
Tewell v. Galbraith.'
Further, the court held that it will construe an instrument
so as to give effect to every part thereof if possible; consequently,
the reservation of the oil rights in Mitchell by his deed to Hamer
was held good although it appeared in the habendum clause rather
than in the granting clause.
The principal question in the case, however, was whether or
not the tax deed to the surface of the land in question passed title
to the mineral right reserved by Mitchell. This question has been
the subject of apparent conflict in other states. In view of this
conflict and the absence of any decision on the point in Colorado,
careful attorneys in this state have long advised their clients to
request separate assessments of mineral estates held by them.
This was the advice given by Mr. Willard S. Snyder in an article
published in Dicta. Speaking of the question involved here, Mr.
Snyder said: 2
The best that can be hoped for is what might be
called an educated guess. . . . If a person is the owner
of a severed mineral estate . . . it is suggested that he
write to the assessor requesting a separate assessment.
. If minerals are not being produced thereon it will
be assesed for a nominal amount . .
The above note of caution was entirely justified at the time,
but it now appears that the ax falls not upon the one who failed
to assure a separate assessment of his mineral estate, but upon
the one who took his ever-worrisome tax deed for granted.
The court built its argument that Mitchell's mineral interest
had not been lost in carefully logical steps. Quoting from the
opinion:
In the instant case, from and after the date of sever-
ance of the oil rights, there were two separate and dis-
tinct freehold estates in the property which theretofore
had been assessed as a unit. . . . It is clear that before
a valid tax deed can be issued . . . there must have
been a valid assessment of the property . . . Under sec-
tion 81, chapter 142, '35 C. S. A., a sufficient description
"for the assessment of such lands" is mandatory .
Where a separate estate consisting of . . . minerals . . .
is created by reservation thereof, a sufficient descrip-
tion of this property for assessment purposes requires
specific reference to the severed estate. . . . If the sep-
arate estate of the owner of the oil interest is held to
be included in a description by section number, without
more to identify the severed interest, the result would
be that the estate in oil is taxed without notice to the
1119 Colo. 412, 205 P. 2d 229 (1949).
2 Taxation and Mineral Interests, 27 DICTA 225 (1950). Be it justly said to
Mr. Snyder's credit that his "guessing" was never far from wrong.
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owner, "under the guise of taxing the property of an-
other. The courts do not favor such a result." Washburn
v. Gregory Company, 125 Minn. 491. 147 N. W. 706 . . .
Certainly it is true that a severed mineral interest is a sep-
arate freehold estate, that a valid tax deed must be based on a
valid assessment, that a valid assessment must include a valid
description, and that a valid description must describe the sep-
arate interests of separate owners. The question that courts of
various states have struggled with is whether the duty to assure
the proper description, and thus a valid assessment, falls upon
the owner or upon the assessor. This case places that duty squarely
upon the assessor, so far as tax deeds are concerned, by saying:
We are satisfied that where oil or mineral rights have
been severed from real estate and are owned by persons
other than those who hold the surface rights, a failure
on the part of the owners to report the mineral rights
to the assessor will not supply the essential requirement
of an assessment of those severed rights as a condition
precedent to a valid tax deed covering said severed in-
terest in land . . Identification of the person who
was at fault for the lack of a valid assessments is of no
importance.
In so holding the court follows the leading Minnesota case of
Washburn v. Gregory Co., quoted above. The court distinguishes
the case of Richards v. Kerr,3 which seems to use contrary lan-
guage, on the ground that there the only interest involved was
freehold estate. After conveyance of same, the assessor had con-
tinued to assess it in the name of the first owner. It was held
that the true owner could not invalidate a treasurer's deed be-
cause the land had been assessed in the name of his predecessor
in interest. It has been said that the Colorado case of Kansas
City Life Ins. Co. v. Prowers County Oil and Gas Co. 4 is con-
trary to the Mitchell case, but an examination of that case shows
it to be clearly distinguishable on the facts.
In accepting the Washburn case as authority, the Colorado
court has joined other states in this area, namely Kansas, New
Mexico, Wyoming and Arkansas, all of which follow the Minne-
sota decision with little deviation.
Other states, such as Iowa and West Virginia, and notably
Mississippi, have held that the burden of proper assessment is
upon the owner-primarily because of state statutes controlling
the question. There is no statute upon the point in Colorado. The
California Supreme Court held in McCracken v. Hummel5 that
since there was in that case no evidence that the tax assessor
had breached his duty, it was required to follow the well-estab-
153 Colo. 376, 127 P. 232 (1912).
'81 Colo. 177, 254 P. 438 (1927).
'43 Calif. 2d 302, 110 P. 2d 700 (1941).
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lished presumption that he had performed his duty correctly;
therefore, the oil interests passed in the tax deed with the sur-
face estate.
Thus it appears that the Colorado court has followed the
majority rule in a question that involves less conflict in other
jurisdictions than appears at first blush. The rule of the Mitchell
case seems a healthy one, and makes it easier for attorneys to
determine approximately how the court will go with other ques-
tions of a similar nature.
The implications of the Mitchell case for the practice of real
estate law in Colorado are, however, very great.
It has been a practice in Colorado for the title examiner to
go back to the first prior tax deed in the chain of title, and, if
that tax deed was valid on its face or was issued more than nine
years before, to pass title as to mineral rights. This is in ac-
cordance with Real Estate Standard No. 47 (Steps are now being
taken to revise this standard to conform to the Mitchell case.)
Clearly, where that practice has been followed the title to mineral
rights so approved may or may not be good, depending on whether
there was a prior severance of a mineral estate, or depending
perhaps on whether there was a quit claim deed from the owner
of such an estate, not reserving the same. The curative statute 6
will not be of any help because there is now no reason to suppose
that a tax deed of the surface of a parcel of land constitutes color
of title to a prior severed mineral estate. Note that the tax deed
in the Mitchell case was issued in 1933.
Nor is there any question of adverse possession, in most in-
stances. It is a very well settled rule of oil and gas law that,
where the mineral estate has previously been severed from the
surface estate, adverse possession of minerals does not start until
there has been actual exporation and discovery.7
It, therefore, becomes clear that in order to fully serve his
client's interests the title examiner must go all the way back to
the patent to assure that the title does not depend upon a tax
deed which was assumed to convey a prior severed mineral estate.
This perhaps does not place any very great burden upon an ab-
stract examiner, but the implications for title search in the
record room are far from encouraging. There is no way around
it-the examiner must go all the way back.
A prominent attorney for a local oil and gas company reports
that the above situation presents no new problems for title exam-
iners for such companies. Their practice has been to go all the
way back to the patent anyway. Mineral reservations may occur
in the patents themselves. Further, where the situation of the
Mitchell case has appeared, oil and gas companies have customarily
paid double rentals.
CoLO. STAT. ANN., C. 40 §§ 146, 147 (1935).
Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P. 2d 600 (1949).
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The Mitchell case was decided on good authority and with
only one dissent-and that dissent referred only to the overruling
of Tewell v. Galbraith, supra. It is certainly a landmark in Colo-
rado law. It would seem that this decision will remain one of
the most significant in recent years.
We cannot leave this case comment, however, without discuss-
ing this one point: It seems that the subject in controversy in
the Mitchell case was largely one of gas rather than oil. The
original reservation in the deed from Mitchell to Hamer was of
"one half of oil right." Under the cases such a reservation ex-
cepts only oil rights, and all other minerals pass by the grant.
To that extent, could this have been useless litigation?
DONALD S. MOLEN
WALLACE L. VANDER JAGT
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE TENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
All members of the Bar are cordially invited and urged to
attend the sessions of the Annual Conference of the Tenth Judicial
District which will be held in the United States District Court
Room in the Post Office Building in Denver on July 17, 18, and
19, 1952.
The first session begins at 10:00 A. M. on Thursday, July
17th, with an address of welcome by Hatfield Chilson, President
of the Colorado Bar Association. Each morning session thereafter
begins at 10:00 A. M. and each afternoon session at 2:00 P. M.
until the end of the conference at noon on Saturday, July 19th.
An unusually outstanding array of judges and legal personalities
will feature this year's program of addresses and panel discussions.
The entertainment arranged includes dinner at the Teller
House in Central City on Thursday evening, July 17th, to be fol-
lowed by a performance of the opera "La Boheme". On Friday
at 6:15 P. M. cocktails will be served at the University Club in
Denver prior to the annual banquet which this year features an
address by Justice Harold H. Burton of the United States Supreme
Court.
Copies of the program for the Conference and tickets for the
banquet may be obtained from Robert B. Cartwright, Clerk, United
States Court of Appeals in Denver.
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